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Abstract 
Two choice architecture interventions were explored to debias investors’ irrational preference 
for mutual funds with high past returns rather than funds with low fees. A simple choice task 
was used involving a direct trade-off between maximizing past returns and minimizing fees.  
In the first intervention, warning investors that, “Some people invest based on past 
performance, but funds with low fees have the highest future results” was more effective than 
three other disclosure statements, including the US financial regulator’s, “Past performance 
does not guarantee future results”. The second intervention involved converting mutual fund 
annual percentage fees into a 10 year dollar cost equivalent. This intervention also improved 
investors’ fee sensitivity, and remained effective even as past returns increased. Financially 
literate participants were surprisingly more likely to irrationally maximize past returns in 
their investment choices. 
Keywords: personal finance; investing; disclosure; financial literacy; nudging 
  
       
IMPROVED MUTUAL FUND INVESTMENT CHOICE ARCHITECTURE 
 
3
Instead of having to buy hundreds of individual stocks, investors can form diversified 
portfolios by just buying a few mutual funds (each containing many stocks). But potential 
mutual fund investors have to consider many fund attributes. Two of the most important 
attributes are the fund’s past performance and the fund’s annual percentage fee (Wilcox, 
2003). The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires mutual funds to tell 
potential investors that, “Past performance does not guarantee future results”.  Although the 
SEC does not insist on a specific wording, this is the phrase they themselves use (SEC, 
2003). This is because the evidence is clear: Past performance does not persist (Carhart, 
1997).  
Mutual funds, and stocks more generally, are commonly described as obeying a 
“random walk”, where each price movement is independent of what has occurred in the past 
(Malkiel, 2016). Nonetheless, many investors do incorrectly assume that high past 
performance is the best guide to high future returns (Greenwood & Shleifer, 2014; Ippolito, 
1992). Minimizing fees is, however, an effective strategy for increasing future expected 
returns for a given level of risk (Malkiel, 2003; Malkiel, 2016), as fees reduce investment 
returns one-for-one on average (Sharpe, 1991), but many mutual fund investors fail to realize 
this (Barber, Odean, & Zheng, 2005; Choi, Laibson, & Madrian, 2010).  This paper adds to 
the literature on investor debiasing interventions, by finding two interventions that can help 
mutual fund investors to minimize fees. 
Back of the envelope calculations show that investors’ losses are massive. In 2014, 
over $8 trillion was invested in US equity mutual funds with an average fee of 0.7% a year 
(Investment Company Institute, 2015), but low-fee index funds with fees of 0.1% a year or 
lower are available. A 0.1% reduction in average fees paid would save investors $8 billion in 
a single year. Many investors may not understand the importance of fees, and the irrelevance 
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of past performance, given the industry’s tendency to prominently advertise funds with 
spectacular past performance (Barber et al., 2005; Jain & Wu, 2000; Koehler & Mercer, 
2009). 
Investors’ preference for maximizing past performance rather than minimizing fees is 
difficult to debias. Choi et al. (2010) presented a sample of highly-educated and financially 
literate Harvard staff members in a mutual fund choice task allocating $10,000 between four 
mutual funds. The funds were selected so that the highest-fee fund had the highest past 
returns, but the lowest-fee fund maximized future returns. Choi et al.’s participants were 
highly financially incentivized, each with a maximum performance-related payment 
differential of $94. Nonetheless, the irrational past return maximizing strategy was extremely 
resistant to debiasing. The most effective intervention involved converting mutual fund fees 
into corresponding dollar cost equivalents (e.g., presenting a 1% fee on $10,000 as $100), but 
this reduced the average fee paid by only $24 from $456 to $432, compared to a minimum 
potential fee of $310. 
Evidence shows that “Past performance does not guarantee future results”, the 
standard form of current financial disclaimers, does not achieve its aims, and can be 
improved. Two studies showed that investors can be helped toward better investment choices 
by disclaimers directly mentioning fees (Fisch & Wilkinson-Ryan, 2014; Mercer, Palmiter, & 
Taha, 2010). However, consider their experimental stimuli: 
Mercer et al. (2010) p.445: 
“Do not expect the fund’s quoted past performance to continue in the future. Studies 
show that mutual funds that have outperformed their peers in the past generally do not 
outperform in the future. Strong past performance is often a matter of chance.” 
Fisch and Wilkinson-Ryan (2014) p.633: 
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“In making your investment decision, you may want to consider the following 
information: The most important single factor in mutual fund performance is the fund’s 
operating expenses (in other words, its fees).” 
Although both disclaimers tell investors about the importance of fees, these 
disclaimers are also much longer than the real world status quo. Long disclaimers will have 
higher implementation costs than short disclaimers.  Also, these disclaimers tell investors 
about the importance of fees, but fail to emphasize this point. It may well be the case that 
disclaimers with a greater attention to investor psychology could be even more effective. The 
first experiment in this paper tests the efficacy of three alternative short-form disclaimers: 
Fees: “The most important single factor in mutual fund performance is the fund’s 
fees” 
Loss: “Investments may go up or down in value, but fund fees represent a permanent 
loss of wealth” 
Social comparison: “Some people invest based on past performance, but funds with 
low fees have the highest future results” 
The fees condition was a shortened version of Fisch and Wilkinson-Ryan’s (2014) fee 
disclaimer. The loss disclaimer was designed to utilize mental accounting (R. Thaler, 1985) 
and loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Fund fees are netted against fund 
performance, so that investors only observe a return net of all fees in their annual statements. 
It was hypothesized that describing the impact of fees separately from other drivers of fund 
performance, and framing fees as a loss  from the status quo of no fees, may increase fee 
salience. The social comparison disclaimer was designed to help participants understand why 
past performance is frequently mentioned (since many investors incorrectly invest based on 
this metric), and yet nonetheless discount this information (and hence achieve superior 
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expected returns). The social comparison disclaimer was designed to tap into social 
comparison, an important driver of behavior (Buunk & Gibbons, 2007). Disclaimers were 
designed to be as concise as possible, with the three new conditions ranging between 13 and 
17 words each. Care was taken to make specific language as similar as possible across all 
conditions. 
The second experiment in this paper directly manipulated the salience of mutual fund 
fees by framing fees as the total dollar cost over 10 years. Mutual fund fees are charged as 
“small” annual percentages, usually 2% or less, which nonetheless add up to large losses of 
wealth over long time horizons. Prior work has explored reframing mutual fund fees as their 
corresponding dollar cost, but this nudge is only marginally-effective (Choi et al., 2010; 
Hastings & Tejeda-Ashton, 2008), and is actually counter-productive when the corresponding 
dollar cost is “small”, i.e., $10-$15 (Newall & Love, 2015). 
Many investors do not understand how to perform financial math with percentages 
(Newall, 2016). Many investors think a return sequence of +10%, - 10% = 0. Correctly 
multiplying these returns yields the answer of = -0.1%. It is highly plausible that investors do 
the same thing with percentage fees which have been reframed as dollar costs. However, this 
means the investors will underestimate how the amount of money lost to fees grows as the 
investment increases in value. Therefore, one solution is to frame fees as the total dollar cost 
incurred over long time periods, such as 10 years (similar to framing car gas economy as the 
cost of gas for driving 100,000 miles; Camilleri & Larrick, 2014). This has an advantage, in 
that a 1% fee will have an increasing 10 year dollar cost fee as mutual fund returns increase 
(since 1% is taken from a larger account value). For example, a 1% fee corresponds 
approximately to $149 on an initial balance of $1,000 if after-fee returns are 4%, but 
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increases to $208 if after-fee returns are 8%. This equilibrating mechanism is hypothesized to 
keep fees salient under the 10 year dollar cost framing, even when past returns are high. 
The SEC does require mutual fund providers to disclose the long-run impact of their 
fees, but this information is relegated to often-long prospectuses of technical information 
(SEC, 2017), which many investors are likely to ignore. Many investors are likely to just 
view the fund’s summary information on mutual fund comparison sites, which tend to just 
include the fund’s annual percentage fee. Figure 1 shows an example. This is the first 
experiment, to our knowledge, to explore the extent to which directly reframing this 
information as a long-term currency cost can help investors to become more aware of mutual 
fund fees.  
 
Figure 1. Example of mutual fund information from Yahoo Finance 
 
Two experiments were conducted to test these hypotheses. Experiment 1 compares 
four mutual fund disclaimers in a simple choice task. Experiment 2 uses the same task to 
contrast the salience of equivalent percentage and long-term dollar cost fees, and how this 
changes as past returns increase.  
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Experiment 1  
Method  
Participants. Participants aged 18 and over and from the US were recruited (N = 
1,003). Participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online crowdsourcing 
site commonly used for psychological research and shown to provide more attentive 
participants than university participant pools (Hauser & Schwarz, 2016; Ramsey, Thompson, 
McKenzie, & Rosenbaum, 2016). Participants were paid a baseline fee of $0.10, with a 
further $0.10 of incentive based on their choices in the mutual fund selection task. Although 
this is a low absolute level of incentive-based pay, it did provide a high relative level of 
incentives, giving participants a chance to double their total earnings. Previous research 
shows that even with high financial incentives, most participants incorrectly maximize past 
returns instead of minimizing fees (Choi et al., 2010). Participants had a mean age of 36.2 
years, 59.2% were female, and 52.5% of the sample had at least a college degree. 
Although participants were drawn from a general population pool, they were not 
unfamiliar with financial concepts. Participants had a mean financial literacy score of 8.6 out 
of 13 (Fernandes, Lynch, & Netemeyer, 2014). Importantly, participants were more 
financially literate than in Fernandes et al.’s three studies, which had mean financial literacy 
scores ranging between 7.27 – 7.81. 
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Procedure. A between-participants design was used, with participants randomly 
assigned to one of four financial disclaimer conditions. Participants completed the main 
choice task before providing demographics and other individual difference information. The 
three treatment disclaimers were tested against a control disclaimer, “Past performance does 
not guarantee future results”. 
Materials. Participants were given a short introduction to mutual fund basics and 
terminology at the beginning of the task. The aim was to give sufficient background to 
someone with zero prior knowledge, but to keep the task short and interesting: 
Earn a bonus of up to $0.10 on this question. The size of your bonus is related 
to the average future performance of an investment like the one you choose. 
Investors can use mutual funds to invest in the stock market. Stock mutual 
funds combine the money of many investors, and use this money to buy a portfolio of 
stocks. Buying a single mutual fund is easier for investors than buying many different 
individual stocks. Mutual funds charge fees in return for this service. Mutual funds 
can be assessed over numerous criteria, but there are two key features. A mutual 
fund’s annual percentage fee gets taken out of an investment in the fund every year. 
Meanwhile, a mutual fund’s past performance is the total return that previous 
investors took home from investing in that fund, after all fees had been subtracted. 
Your task is to choose one of these four funds to invest in. Each fund follows a 
similar strategy, and was launched at the same time ten years ago. 
The final sentence informs participants that differences in fund performance are not 
due to one fund investing in a riskier portfolio than the others – the only reason for expecting 
past performance differences to extend into the future (Malkiel, 2003; Malkiel, 2016). The 
prominent placing of this sentence should help inform participants that the funds do not differ 
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in terms of strategy, average risk level, or assets, and so preferences over these attributes are 
not relevant to the decision. Performance differences such as these would typically occur due 
to portfolio allocation differences between various active fund managers, and will not be 
predictive of future performance (Carhart, 1997). Therefore, participants should normatively 
ignore the past performance, and instead minimize fees, which is predictive of high future 
performance (Malkiel, 2003; Malkiel, 2016) 
In line with previous mutual fund debiasing experiments, there was a positive 
association between past returns and fees, providing participants with a dilemma over 
whether to minimize fees or maximize past returns (Choi et al., 2010; Mauck & Salzsieder, 
2017; Newall & Love, 2015). Table 1 shows the four mutual funds participants were asked to 
choose from, ranging from a fund with fees of 0.5% and past performance of 2%, to a fund 
with fees of 2% and past performance of 8%. These values were used to tempt participants 
toward maximizing past performance in the baseline condition, which the treatment 
disclaimers attempted to debias participants away from.  
 
Table 1 
 
 
Immediately below this table was the financial disclaimer, e.g., “Past performance 
does not guarantee future results”. Importantly, each of the four disclaimers provides 
effectively equivalent information to investors: That selection should not be based on past 
Mutual Funds on Offer in Experiment 1 
Fund cues Fund A Fund B Fund C Fund D 
Fees 2.0% a year 1.5% a year 1.0% a year 0.5% a year 
Past performance 8.0% a year 6.0% a year 4.0% a year 2.0% a year 
       
IMPROVED MUTUAL FUND INVESTMENT CHOICE ARCHITECTURE 
 
11
performance, and therefore should be based on fund fees (the only other cue that varies). Any 
differences across the four disclaimers must therefore be due to investor psychology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measures. The dependent variable was fund selection from the four funds in Table 1. 
The funds offer a monotonic trade-off between maximizing past returns and minimizing fees. 
This forced choice paradigm was chosen over the alternative: A hypothetical portfolio 
allocation task, where money is allocated continuously between the funds on offer (Choi et 
al., 2010; Fisch & Wilkinson-Ryan, 2014). Hypothetical portfolio allocation tasks may 
underestimate real world effect sizes if experimental participants respond heuristically 
because they have less cognitive resources than real world investors. The naïve 
diversification heuristic would involve putting an equal allocation of cash in each fund 
(Benartzi & Thaler, 2001), and appears prevalent in similar investment choice tasks 
(Bateman, Dobrescu, Newell, Ortmann, & Thorp, 2016; Mauck & Salzsieder, 2017). A 
forced choice paradigm avoids these potential problems. Furthermore, it has been suggested 
that a failure to minimize mutual fund fees is driven by the naïve diversification heuristic 
(Mauck & Salzsieder, 2017). Ruling out naïve diversification allows this experiment to see 
whether additional factors underlie investors’ inability to minimize mutual fund fees. 
Previous research shows that hypothetical investment choices are substantially influenced by 
the range of investments on offer (Vlaev, Chater, & Stewart, 2007), so having an even 
number of funds prevents participants from picking a focal central option.  
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Bonus size varied in $0.02 increments across Table 1, from $0.10 for the fee-
minimizing fund to $0.04 for the past return-maximizing fund, reflecting the true negative 
relationship between fees and future performance. 
After the main choice task participants answered a number of individual difference 
blocks in randomized order. Participants gave demographic information of age, education, 
and gender. Participants answered a 13-part financial literacy scale (Fernandes et al., 2014), 
and the short form scale for social comparison orientation (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). 
Participants also provided a short measure of loss aversion (Harinck, Van Beest, Van Dijk, & 
Van Zeeland, 2012). 
It was hypothesized that the success of the three new financial disclaimers may 
depend on relevant individual difference variables (all disclaimers with financial literacy, the 
loss disclaimer with loss aversion, and the social comparison disclaimer with social 
comparison orientation). It is important to examine whether specific disclaimers may be 
especially effective with sub-groups of the population. 
Materials and data for the experiments reported in this paper can be accessed from 
osf.io/kpz5r. 
Results 
In the experiments that follow, the main dependent variable was the choice of one of 
four mutual funds, violating the standard assumption of ordinary least squares (where the 
dependent variable can take on any value). Because the mutual funds on offer have a 
monotonic relationship between maximizing past performance and minimizing fees, an 
ordinal logistic regression was used. Ordinal logistic regression utilizes this ordering of the 
dependent variable and leads to increased statistical power compared to non-ordered models, 
such as multinomial logistic regression (Liu, 2015).  
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 Table 2 shows the percentage of responses per cell. As can be seen, the percentage of 
participants minimizing fees almost doubled from 12.3% in the control to 20.7% in the social 
comparison condition. This is a remarkably effective nudge for such a simple disclaimer, in a 
choice task that is designed to tempt participants towards the common error of maximizing 
past returns. The loss disclaimer did not lead to a significant improvement in fee-sensitivity 
compared to the control condition (B = 0.01, z = 0.11, p = .916, 95% CI [-0.24, 0.26]), but the 
fees condition did (B = 0.33, z = 2.25, p = .024, 95% CI [0.04, 0.61]) and the social 
comparison condition also did (B = 0.59, z = 4.29, p < .001, 95% CI [0.32, 0.87]). A post-hoc 
comparison revealed that the improvement in fee-sensitivity was greater in the social 
comparison condition than in the fees condition (B = 0.45, z = 2.78, p = .006, 95% CI [0.13, 
0.77]). “Some people invest based on past performance, but funds with low fees have the 
highest future results” was a more effective disclaimer than either the real-world status quo, 
or the fees disclaimer based on previous experimental debiasing research (Fisch & 
Wilkinson-Ryan, 2014). 
 
Table 2 
Note. Disclaimer texts for each condition were as follows. Control: “Past performance does 
not guarantee future results”; Fees: “The most important single factor in mutual fund 
Percentage of Responses Per Experimental Cell 
Response Control Fees Losses Social comparison 
Fund A 
(Maximize past 
performance) 
43.1% 32.7% 38.0% 28.4% 
Fund B 27.8% 28.2% 28.2% 27.9% 
Fund C 16.9% 21.2% 19.0% 23.0% 
Fund D 
(Minimize fees) 
12.3% 17.9% 14.7% 20.7% 
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performance is the fund’s fees”; Loss: “Investments may go up or down in value, but fund 
fees represent a permanent loss of wealth”; Social comparison: “Some people invest based on 
past performance, but funds with low fees have the highest future results”. 
 
 The ordinal logistic regression depends on the “proportional odds assumption”: That 
the predictors have identical effects across the three transitions between the four outcomes of 
the dependent variable (Williams, 2006). However, a Brant test showed that this assumption 
was not valid for either the social comparison (𝛘2 (2) = 9.09, p = .011) or fees disclaimer 
conditions (𝛘2 (2) = 25.36, p < .001). Therefore, a partial proportional odds model was fitted 
where the effect of these two disclaimers was estimated over the three transition probabilities 
across the dependent variable (Williams, 2006). All three transition probabilities were 
significant for the social comparison disclaimer (p-values < .01), showing that participants 
were always more fee-sensitive with this disclaimer compared to the control condition. For 
the fees disclaimer, the transition probability between Funds A and B was not significant (z = 
-0.14, p = .887), but the two other transition probabilities were (p-values < .001). This shows 
that the fees disclaimer was not effective in changing behavior when fees and past 
performance were extremely high (Funds A and B), but was otherwise effective. 
Participants were on average financially literate, with a mean score of 8.6 out of 13. 
The original regression model was re-run, adding a regression term for standardized financial 
literacy (see Model 2 in Table 3). Interestingly, there was a statistically significant negative 
relationship between financial literacy and fee-sensitivity (B = -0.18, z = -3.04, p = .002, 95% 
CI [-0.29, -0.06]). More financially-literate participants were more likely to choose the 
mutual fund with high past returns and high fees. Analysis of marginal effects showed that a 
one standard deviation increase in financial literacy was associated with a four percentage 
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point increase in probability of choosing the highest-fee fund. This relationship remained 
statistically significant after controlling for demographic variables of age, education, and 
gender (Model 3 in Table 3). 
Table 3 
Ordinal Logistic Regression Predicting Fee Sensitivity in Mutual Fund Choice 
Dependent variable: Mutual fund choice 
 
                M1                                                           M2     M3 
Social comparison    0.60*** 0.62*** 0.62*** 
Fees framing    0.33* 0.35* 0.34* 
Loss disclaimer    0.01 0.02 0.01 
Financial literacy  -0.18** -0.13* 
Age   -0.01 
Education   0.41 
   0.52 
   0.33 
Gender   0.20 
Significance levels:  *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001. 
 
Participants also had a mean social comparison index of 18.6 out of 30, and a mean 
loss aversion parameter of 6.2. These individual difference parameters were interacted with 
the three treatment conditions to test for ex-ante plausible individual differences. Separate 
regression models added the main effect of the individual difference parameter and an 
interaction term between the parameter and treatment condition. Specifically, the three 
treatment conditions were each separately interacted with financial literacy, social 
comparison with social comparison orientation, and the loss treatment with loss aversion. A 
natural logarithm transformation was first performed on the loss aversion parameter to reduce 
positive skewness. None of these models’ interaction terms were statistically significant, 
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suggesting that the effectiveness of these financial disclaimers does not vary between 
individuals on the basis of these measures.
1
 The only marginally significant interaction term 
was between the social comparison condition and social comparison orientation (B = 0.23, z 
= 1.79, p = .073, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.48]). This suggests a potential trend where this disclaimer 
may work even better in individuals with high social comparison orientation, and provides 
some evidence for the hypothesized mechanism via social comparison. However, this does 
not affect the results on a practical level, since this was already the most effective disclaimer 
across all participants. 
Experiment 1b 
It could be argued that the social comparison disclaimer only worked because of a 
demand effect, i.e., that this disclaimer made it clearer to participants which mutual fund 
would maximize their bonus payment. A non-incentivized replication was designed to test 
this explanation. 
Method 
 Another 761 participants were recruited from the same pool (no participant took part 
in more than one experiment), and were randomly assigned to one of the control, fees, or 
social comparison disclaimer conditions. The loss condition was not used since this 
disclaimer was not more effective than the control condition in Experiment 1. Individual 
difference measures were not collected on this occasion. Participants were compensated with 
a baseline payment of $0.20, with no incentive-based payment, thus eliminating any potential 
demand effects from the incentive payment. 
                                                 
1
 Statistical significance of interaction models in non-linear probability models can be 
difficult to interpret, so it is recommended to also check the significance of interaction effects 
under ordinary least squares (Ai & Norton, 2003). Statistical significance of all interaction 
effects reported in this paper was unaffected under ordinary least squares, and so will not be 
reported. 
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Results 
The social comparison disclaimer increased the percentage of fee-minimizing 
responses from 13.2% in the control condition to 21.0%, as seen in Table 4. The results of an 
ordinal linear regression showed that the social comparison disclaimer was again effective 
compared to the control disclaimer (B = 0.51, z = 3.23, p = .001, 95% CI [0.20, 0.82]) but the 
fees disclaimer was not on this occasion (B = 0.17, z = 1.04, p = .298, 95% CI [-0.15, 0.50]). 
The social comparison disclaimer was again more effective than the fees disclaimer (B = 
0.32, z = 1.97, p = .049, 95% CI [0.01, 0.64]). 
Table 4 
  
Percentage of Responses Per Experimental Cell in Experiment 1b 
Response Control Fees Social comparison 
Fund A 
(Maximize past 
performance) 
45.4% 37.1% 32.1% 
Fund B 22.2% 22.4% 22.3% 
Fund C 19.3% 22.7% 24.7% 
Fund D 
(Minimize fees) 
13.2% 17.9% 21.0% 
 
Results of a Brant test showed that the parallel lines assumption held for the social 
comparison disclaimer (𝛘2 (2) = 1.79, p = .408) but not for the fees disclaimer (𝛘2 (2) = 
11.40, p = .003). Results of a partial proportional odds model showed that the fees disclaimer 
was effective for the lowest levels of fees and past performance between Funds C and D (z = 
3.12, p = .002), but was not otherwise effective (p-values > .292). On a practical level these 
results confirm the incentivized experiment: The social comparison disclaimer worked best 
out of those tested. 
 
       
IMPROVED MUTUAL FUND INVESTMENT CHOICE ARCHITECTURE 
 
18
Experiment 1c 
It could further be argued that the social comparison disclaimer worked best out of 
those tested because it gave overly strong guidance to investors. A very high fee fund might, 
by chance, outperform the market and its rivals for a long time. It might be argued that the 
disclaimer should relate to the performance of funds on average, rather than reflecting an 
exact prediction for any given fund. Therefore a replication experiment was conducted, to see 
if the following weaker social comparison disclaimer remained the most effective nudge: 
“Some people invest based on past performance, but on average funds with low fees 
have the highest future results.” (Adding the words “on average”.) 
Method 
Another 754 participants were recruited from the same pool, and were randomly 
assigned to one of the control, fees, or social comparison (alternative) disclaimer conditions. 
Participants were rewarded as in Experiment 1, with $0.10 of baseline payment, and up to 
$0.10 of performance-based payment depending on their choice from the four funds. 
Individual difference measures were again not collected on this occasion. 
Results 
The social comparison disclaimer increased the percentage of fee-minimizing 
responses from 7.6% in the control condition to 17.9%, as seen in Table 5. The results of an 
ordinal linear regression showed that the social comparison disclaimer was again effective 
compared to the control disclaimer (B = 0.91, z = 5.63, p < .001, 95% CI [0.60, 1.23]) as was 
the fees disclaimer this time (B = 0.46, z = 2.84, p = .005, 95% CI [0.14, 0.78]). But the social 
comparison disclaimer was again more effective than the fees disclaimer (B = 0.42, z = 2.54, 
p = .011, 95% CI [0.10, 0.74]). 
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Table 5 
 
Percentage of Responses Per Experimental Cell in Experiment 1c 
Response Control Fees 
Social comparison 
(alternative) 
Fund A 
(Maximize past 
performance) 
46.9% 42.0% 27.1% 
Fund B 31.3% 22.8% 25.3% 
Fund C 14.2% 13.6% 29.7% 
Fund D 
(Minimize fees) 
7.6% 21.6% 17.9% 
 
Results of a Brant test showed that the parallel lines assumption held for the social 
comparison disclaimer (𝛘2 (2) = 3.28, p = .194) but not for the fees disclaimer (𝛘2 (2) = 
14.05, p < .001). Results of a partial proportional odds model showed that the fees disclaimer 
was not effective for the highest levels of fees and past performance between Funds A and B 
(z = 1.39, p = .164). As can be seen from Table 5, only 27.1% of participants in the social 
disclaimer condition maximized past returns (and fees), but 42.0% in the fees condition did 
(compared to 46.9% in the control condition). Despite the weaker wording, the social 
comparison disclaimer still the most effective out of those tested. 
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2’s goal was to discover whether part of investors’ reluctance to minimize 
fees is due to a misunderstanding of the long-run impact of small annual percentage fees 
around 0.5% to 2%. Fees were either framed as percentages, or as the equivalent 10 year 
currency cost that an initial investment of $1,000 would have incurred. Previous experiments 
converting a mutual fund fee into its corresponding annual currency cost showed limited 
ability to increase fee-sensitivity (Choi et al., 2010; Newall & Love, 2015). However, it was 
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hypothesized that the 10 year currency cost frame could increase the salience of fees, even 
when past returns were very high. 
Method 
Experiment two was a 2x2 within-subjects experiment, manipulating fee framing 
(percentages, long-term dollar cost) and past returns (low, high). A within-subjects design 
was used to maximize power, and because no demand effects were expected (the key fee 
framing manipulation is not obvious). The experiment was otherwise very similar to 
Experiment 1. 
Participants. Experiment 1’s participants were collected from a general population 
sample who, despite high average financial literacy scores, may still have been unfamiliar 
with investing decisions. Therefore, two versions of Experiment 2 were run.  
In Experiment 2a, another 503 US-based participants were recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (no participant took part in more than one experiment). Participants had a 
mean age of 34.5 years, 46.7% had at least a college degree, and 57.1% were female. 
Participants had a mean financial literacy score of 8.3 out of 13. The payment scheme in 
Experiment 2a was the same as in Experiment 1. 
In Experiment 2b, US-based participants were recruited from another online 
crowdsourcing site, Prolific Academic (N = 501), and were given a baseline payment of just 
over a dollar. To qualify for this experiment, participants must have previously responded 
“yes” to the question, "Have you ever made investments (either personal or through your 
employment) in the common stock or shares of a company?" Participants had a higher mean 
financial literacy score of 9.6, suggesting that this sample was indeed more representative of 
individual investors. Participants had a mean age of 33.4 years, 60.1% had at least a college 
degree, and 37.5% were female. One randomly selected participant was incentivized based on 
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one randomly selected trial with a simulated 10 year $100 stock market investment. This 
investment had a normally-distributed annual return of mean (8% - fund fee) and standard 
deviation of 20%, roughly corresponding to US stock market averages (Dimson, Marsh, & 
Staunton, 2009). 
Materials. Participants received the same materials as in Experiment 1 (with the 
control disclaimer, “Past performance does not guarantee future results”), but with the 
following changes. The bonus instruction stated that they would be paid on the basis of one 
question. The sentence, “Each fund has charged the same annual percentage fee each year.” 
was added at the end of experimental instructions, as this fact is no longer clear in the long-
term dollar cost conditions. (This statement could, however, plausibly be misunderstood by 
participants to mean that each fund charged exactly the same fee. Eliminating any confusion 
caused by this would likely strengthen the results.)  
Table 6 shows the combinations of fees and past performance in each condition. 
Identical percentage fees were used for funds A-D in every condition. Past performance 
either varied monotonically from 8% to 2% a year in the low past returns conditions, or from 
16% to 2% a year in the high past returns conditions. Notice that doubling past performance 
from 8% to 16% nearly doubles the 10-year dollar cost impact of a 2% annual fee from $435 
to $822. Dollar cost fees were described as “Fees over 10 years*” with clarification below the 
table, “*Total fees based on $1,000 investment over 10 years.” 
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Table 6 
Note: Currency cost fees framed as the, “Total fees based on $1,000 investment over 10 
years.” 
 
 Dollar cost fees were calculated as the simple arithmetic difference in compounding 
between a fund’s past performance and a fund without any fees at all. For example, the fund 
with past returns of 8% a year and fees of 2% a year was calculated as the difference in final 
value between $1,000 at 10% a year and 8% a year. This calculation underestimates the 
impact of fees, since it neglects per-period compounding between the return and the fee (the 
fee reduces the value of the returns in addition to the principal). True dollar costs will 
therefore be higher than in Table 6. These conservative calculations were chosen in case 
Fund Menus in Each Condition in Experiment 2 
Condition Fund cues Fund A Fund B Fund C Fund D 
Percentages, 
low returns 
Fees 2.0% a year 1.5% a year 1.0% a year 0.5% a year 
 
Past 
Performance 
8.0% a year 6.0% a year 4.0% a year 2.0% a year 
Currency cost, 
low returns 
Fees $435 $270 $149 $61 
 
Past 
Performance 
8.0% a year 6.0% a year 4.0% a year 2.0% a year 
Percentages, 
high returns 
Fees 2.0% a year 1.5% a year 1.0% a year 0.5% a year 
 
Past 
Performance 
16.0% a year 8.0% a year 4.0% a year 2.0% a year 
Currency cost, 
high returns 
Fees $822 $319 $149 $61 
 
Past 
Performance 
16.0% a year 8.0% a year 4.0% a year 2.0% a year 
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investors attempted to back out the percentage fee in the dollar cost condition. This is also a 
conservative test of the experimental hypothesis.  
Measures. The same demographic questions and financial literacy scale as in 
Experiment 1 were collected after participants chose between the four mutual funds in each 
condition. 
Results 
Table 7 shows the percentage of responses per experimental cell. The number of 
participants minimizing fees more than doubled from 6.3% to 13.1% across the most extreme 
high returns conditions as fees were reframed from annual percentages to long-term dollar 
cost in Experiment 2a.  Results were almost identical across Experiments 2a and 2b. A 
comparison of cell-by-cell responses in Table 7 illustrates that the Experiment 2b’s investor 
sample were actually slightly more likely to irrationally maximize past returns than 
Experiment 2a’s general population sample. Below we analyze the results of Experiment 2b 
only (investor sample), as the same pattern of results was also found in Experiment 2a. 
Table 7 
 
Percentage of Responses Per Experimental Cell in Experiment 2 
Response Low returns  High Returns  
 Percentages Currency Cost Percentages Currency 
Fund A 
(Maximize past 
performance) 
43.6% (50.3%) 32.6% (37.0%) 56.8% (67.9%) 36.9% (38.5%) 
Fund B 31.2% (29.6%) 32.4% (32.8%) 26.7% (21.4%) 32.3% (32.6%) 
Fund C 15.0% (12.8%) 19.6% (18.3%) 10.2% (7.1%) 17.7% (17.6%) 
Fund D 
(Minimize fees) 
10.2% (7.3%) 15.4% (11.9%) 6.3% (3.6%) 13.1% (11.3%) 
Note. The first percentage in each cell refers to Experiment 2a (general population sample), 
and the second percentage in parentheses refers to Experiment 2b (investor sample). Results 
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across both experiments are very similar, with the investor sample having a slightly higher 
tendency to irrationally maximize past performance. 
 
 
 An ordinal logistic regression was again used to analyze Experiment 2b’s results (see 
Table 8 for regression model coefficients). Main effects of fee framing (B = 0.86, z = 10.99, p 
< .001, 95% CI [0.71, 1.01]) and past returns level were significant (B = -0.36, z = -5.92, p < 
.001, 95% CI [-0.48, -0.24]). Results of a Brant test showed that the parallel lines assumption 
held for past returns level (𝛘2 (2) = 2.43, p = .297) but not for fee framing (𝛘2 (2) = 38.17, p < 
.001). Results of a partial proportional odds model showed that reframing fees as a 10 year 
currency cost was effective at all levels of fees and past performance (p-values < .001).  
The model was improved by the addition of an interaction effect (B = -0.68, z = -5.48, 
p < .001, 95% CI [-0.92, - 0.44]), meaning that the effect of fee framing became stronger in 
the high- than low-fees condition (Model 2 in Table 8). The significant interaction term 
means that there was a larger improvement in fee-sensitivity from long-term dollar cost 
framing in the high- than low-past returns condition. Long-term dollar cost framing became if 
anything more effective as past returns increased. 
 The regression model was rerun with the addition of a control for standardized 
financial literacy score (Model 3 in Table 8). As in Experiment 1, there was a negative 
correlation between financial literacy and fee-sensitivity (B = -0.31, z = -4.63, p < .001, 95% 
CI [-0.44, -0.18]). Significance of this result was again unaffected by inclusion of the other 
demographic variables (Model 4 in Table 8). Analysis of marginal effects showed that a one 
standard deviation increase in financial literacy was associated with a seven percentage point 
increase in probability of choosing the highest-fee fund. 
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Table 8   
Significance levels:  *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001. 
 
Discussion 
This paper adds to a growing experimental literature on potential mutual fund 
investment disclosure interventions. Two main avenues of investigation in this literature have 
been the strengthening of disclosure statements (Fisch & Wilkinson-Ryan, 2014; Mercer et 
al., 2010)  and the reframing of mutual fund fees (Choi et al., 2010; Hastings & Tejeda-
Ashton, 2008; Newall & Love, 2015), in addition to more general interventions for helping 
investors (Bateman et al., 2016; Beshears, Choi, Laibson, & Madrian, 2011; Koehler & 
Mercer, 2009).  
This paper demonstrates that social comparison disclaimers, e.g., “Some people invest 
based on past performance, but funds with low fees have the highest future results”, and the 
long-term dollar cost framing of fees can prove effective as mutual fund choice architecture 
features compared to the real world status quo and previously explored alternatives. Future 
research should explore the inferences that investors draw from disclosure statements. It 
Ordinal Logistic Regression Predicting Fee Sensitivity in Mutual Fund Choice 
Dependent variable: Mutual fund choice  
 M1 M2 M3 M4 
Fees framing 0.86*** 0.54*** 0.55*** 0.55*** 
Past returns -0.36*** -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 
Fees x past returns  -0.68*** -0.70*** -0.70*** 
Financial literacy   -0.33*** -0.30*** 
Age    -0.01 
Education    -0.43 
    -0.50 
    -0.38 
Gender    0.18 
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could be that the baseline disclaimer, “Past performance does not guarantee future results” 
nonetheless implies some positive link between past and future performance, and that 
disclaimers work best by fully breaking this link and providing investors with the true link 
between fees and future returns. That could plausibly explain why the social comparison 
disclaimer worked best out of those tested. Further investigation of this topic could help to 
maximize the gains from this relatively simple nudge for mutual fund investors. 
Although the effects found in this paper were statistically significant, bias did not 
disappear even in this simplified choice problem. Selecting mutual funds appears to be a 
daunting and challenging task for many investors, who are prone to be misled by distracting 
past returns (Greenwood & Shleifer, 2014; Ippolito, 1992). Naïve diversification has also 
been put forward as an explanation for this bias (Mauck & Salzsieder, 2017). These 
experiments show that many investors err even when diversification between different funds 
is not possible. The low absolute level of financial incentives used in this paper may not be to 
blame, as participants maximize past returns in the previous literature even with much higher 
incentives (Choi et al., 2010). The difficulty that participants have in minimizing fees in 
experimental mutual fund tasks highlights both the importance of further research on this 
topic, and that real world investors require improved mutual fund choice architecture to 
choose wisely. 
Default options have been much studied as a behavior change tool (Johnson & 
Goldstein, 2003). Although well-chosen defaults can have many beneficial effects for 
personal investors (R. H. Thaler & Benartzi, 2004), defaults raise important ethical debates 
(Smith, Goldstein, & Johnson, 2013). Potential ethical issues surrounding default options are 
one reason why research should continue to explore a range of methods to help debias 
investors, as in this paper. 
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The negative correlation between financial literacy and fee-sensitivity was 
unexpected. However, similar results have been found before in mutual fund choice tasks 
(Koehler & Mercer, 2009; Pontari, Stanaland, & Smythe, 2009). Because the financial 
literacy scale was performed after the main task, it is possible that the main task may have 
affected latter performance on the scale. However, the negative correlations remain even after 
removing the three mutual fund questions from the financial literacy scale, suggesting this is 
not the case. Although this was only correlational evidence, it occurred over both 
experiments, and should be interpreted in the context of a wider body of evidence showing 
that interventions for increasing financial literacy have little average effect on improving 
financial behaviors (Fernandes et al., 2014). This suggests that effective choice architecture 
manipulations should be cost effective at changing behavior compared to direct financial 
literacy education campaigns. 
Improving access to financial advice is another plausible method for improving 
financial behavior. However, many financial advisers mistakenly maximize high past returns 
to an even greater degree than their clients (Linnainmaa, Melzer, & Previtero, 2016). 
Linnainmaa et al. also found a positive correlation between investing experience and 
maximizing past returns amongst individual investors. These results are consistent with the 
findings across Experiments 2a and 2b, where the investor sample in Experiment 2b were 
slightly more likely to maximize past returns than the general population sample (Table 6). 
This helps provide reassurance that Experiment 1’s results, based on a general population 
sample, should still be valid for the sub-set of the population currently making active 
financial decisions. 
Choice architecture interventions for helping mutual fund investors to minimize fees 
are unlikely to be voluntarily enacted by the industry, and so this is an area where 
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behaviourally-informed public policy may be required (Erta, Hunt, Iscenko, & Brambley, 
2013; Sunstein, 2016). The large gaps between normative fee-minimizing behavior and 
control condition choices in this simplified investment choice task suggest that real world 
investors are in desperate need of clearer guidance than, “Past performance does not 
guarantee future results”. 
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